Price mechanism

Results: 172



#Item
11Mechanisms with Unique Learnable Equilibria ¨ PAUL DUTTING , Stanford University THOMAS KESSELHEIM, Cornell University ´

Mechanisms with Unique Learnable Equilibria ¨ PAUL DUTTING , Stanford University THOMAS KESSELHEIM, Cornell University ´

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Source URL: paulduetting.com

Language: English - Date: 2014-04-23 11:54:36
12CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #7: Submodular Valuations∗ Tim Roughgarden† January 29,

CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #7: Submodular Valuations∗ Tim Roughgarden† January 29,

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2014-02-04 12:07:39
13Near-optimal multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders Elias Koutsoupias London

Near-optimal multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders Elias Koutsoupias London

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Source URL: www.maths.lse.ac.uk

Language: English - Date: 2013-10-31 12:50:34
14Revenue Maximizing Mechanisms with Strategic Customers and Unknown Demand: Name-Your-Own-Price. Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu and Philipp Strack∗ May 16, 2015

Revenue Maximizing Mechanisms with Strategic Customers and Unknown Demand: Name-Your-Own-Price. Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu and Philipp Strack∗ May 16, 2015

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Source URL: pluto.huji.ac.il

Language: English - Date: 2015-09-08 20:46:28
15CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #14: The Price of Anarchy in Simple Auctions ∗  Tim Roughgarden†

CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #14: The Price of Anarchy in Simple Auctions ∗ Tim Roughgarden†

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2016-05-10 16:20:06
16RESEARCH ARTICLE  THE MAKING OF A GOOD IMPRESSION: INFORMATION HIDING IN AD EXCHANGES Zhen Sun, Milind Dawande, Ganesh Janakiraman, and Vijay Mookerjee Naveen Jindal School of Management, The University of Texas at Dalla

RESEARCH ARTICLE THE MAKING OF A GOOD IMPRESSION: INFORMATION HIDING IN AD EXCHANGES Zhen Sun, Milind Dawande, Ganesh Janakiraman, and Vijay Mookerjee Naveen Jindal School of Management, The University of Texas at Dalla

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Source URL: www.misq.org

Language: English - Date: 2016-07-05 15:06:06
17CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #2: Unit-Demand Bidders and Walrasian Equilibria∗ Tim Roughgarden† January 8, 2014

CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #2: Unit-Demand Bidders and Walrasian Equilibria∗ Tim Roughgarden† January 8, 2014

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2015-07-26 15:17:56
18Algorithmic Game Theory  Summer 2015, Week 5 Introduction to Mechanism Design ETH Z¨

Algorithmic Game Theory Summer 2015, Week 5 Introduction to Mechanism Design ETH Z¨

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Source URL: www.cadmo.ethz.ch

Language: English - Date: 2016-01-25 09:13:39
19Bats Auction Mechanism (BAM)  Price improvement opportunity for facilitating customers’ orders U.S. Options BAM, the Bats Auction Mechanism, allows Members to facilitate their clients’ (agency) orders on the Bats EDG

Bats Auction Mechanism (BAM) Price improvement opportunity for facilitating customers’ orders U.S. Options BAM, the Bats Auction Mechanism, allows Members to facilitate their clients’ (agency) orders on the Bats EDG

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Source URL: cdn.batstrading.com

Language: English - Date: 2016-08-01 09:28:38
20X Do Externalities Degrade GSP’s Efficiency? Tim Roughgarden, Stanford ´ Tardos, Cornell Eva

X Do Externalities Degrade GSP’s Efficiency? Tim Roughgarden, Stanford ´ Tardos, Cornell Eva

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2012-06-21 14:07:51